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MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF CONTRACTUAL
PROVISIONS: AN APPLICATION TO DEFAULT
PROVISIONS IN VENTURE CAPITAL
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
Kate Litvakt
This Article has two main components: methodological and substan-
tive. Methodologically, it develops a new way of measuring and coding the
financial impact of contractual, statutory, and regulatory variables through
Monte Carlo simulations. The simulation approach develops a measure of
value by putting a hypothetical party in a realistic environment and asking
how much this party stands to gain or lose from particular contractual or
legal provisions.
Substantively, this Article studies default provisions in venture capital
partnership agreements. It tests whether the extent to which venture capital
funds lock in their equity capital is related to the level of agency costs. Ifind
that the degree of capital lock-in is inversely related to several measures of
expected agency costs. Better venture organizations (proxied by past invest-
ment outcomes) lock up investors' capital more tightly, as do funds where
managers' compensation is more heavily based on performance and funds
that employ alternative governance devices. Looking beyond venture capital
funds, this evidence is not consistent with theoretical suggestions that strong
equity capital lock-in by firms is generally desirable, and suggests that the
optimal degree of equity capital lock-in depends on balancing the firm's need
for stable capital against the need to limit agency costs between managers
and investors.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article has two main components: methodological and sub-
stantive. Methodologically, it develops a new way of measuring and
coding the economic impact of contractual, statutory, and regulatory
variables as well as judicial opinions and general institutional practices
through Monte Carlo simulations. The simulation approach creates a
cardinal measure of value by putting a hypothetical party in a realistic
environment and asking how much this party stands to gain or lose
from specific changes in contractual or legal provisions.
More specifically, I use simulations to quantify the penalties that
venture capital partnership agreements impose on venture fund inves-
tors who default on their contractual obligation to supply capital when
requested by the fund. I rely on data on the timing and amounts of
venture fund investments and returns to estimate the cost of default to
an investor at various times after fund formation.'
I Due to the confidential nature of the data used in this analysis and nondisclosure
agreements between the author and source holders, Cornell Law Review has not verified
information contained in the venture capital agreements discussed in this Article. All er-
rors remain the author's, and Cornell Law Review assumes no responsibility for the accuracy
of the data or the conclusions drawn herein.
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Substantively, I ask whether the extent to which venture funds
"lock in" their equity capital is related to the level of agency costs. I
find that the degree of capital lock-in is inversely related to several
measures of expected agency costs. Better venture organizations
(proxied by using past investment outcomes) lock up investors' capital
more tightly, as do funds where managers' compensation is more
heavily based on performance and funds that employ alternative gov-
ernance devices.
Looking beyond venture capital firms, how valuable is a firm's
ability to lock in its assets-that is, to shield its assets from a firm's
investors and the investors' creditors? Very valuable, argue some. A
firm whose assets can be easily withdrawn by investors will have diffi-
culty attracting investors, creditors, and contractual partners.2 Doing
business with such a firm is expensive: one would have to investigate
the financial state of the firm, the current and expected future finan-
cial state of its investors, and investors' proclivities for moving their
money, and then discount for the risk that the firm will not be around
in the future. The unlocked-capital firm will bear these costs through
a higher cost of capital, foregone business opportunities, vulnerability
to liquidity shocks, trouble attracting employees or persuading them
to invest in firm-specific human capital, and transaction costs for the
firm to replace withdrawn capital or for third parties to contract with
the firm's investors over lock-in.3
These considerations give rise to the "maximum lock-in" theory,
which claims that equity firms do and should seek as much lock-in of
equity capital as the law allows. 4
An alternate approach, which I call the "variable lock-in" theory,
would begin by observing that while capital lock-in has the benefits
discussed by the maximum lock-in theorists, it also has significant
drawbacks. First, a credible investor threat to withdraw capital from
an underperforming firm forces managers to work harder, thereby re-
ducing agency costs. This threat is a particularly good motivator given
the real-world difficulty of removing managers through investor vot-
ing. Second, investor threat to withdraw capital makes it more costly
for managers or controlling shareholders to transfer wealth from mi-
2 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the
Finn, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (2006); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
Essential Role of Organization Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 402 (2000).
3 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387, 390-95 (2003); Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 277-78
(1999).
4 See Blair, supra note 3, at 427-28; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 2, at
1342-43; Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. IL. L. REv. 253, 266-67.
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nority investors to themselves, which reduces self-dealing costs.5 Thus,
although capital lock-in protects a firm's liquidity, it may increase
agency costs and self-dealing costs. On the debt side, both contract
terms and contract length respond to these costs; the same may plausi-
bly occur on the equity side. Thus, instead of seeking maximum lock-
in of equity capital, firms may engage in vaiable lock-in, balancing
liquidity needs with governance needs.
The maximum lock-in theory predicts that firms should seek as
much equity capital lock-in as the law allows. The variable lock-in the-
ory predicts that the degree of lock-in will vary across firms, and that
firms facing higher agency and self-dealing costs will be more likely to
allow investors to withdraw equity capital. I test these hypotheses by
studying the lock-in choices of venture capital funds. Venture capital
funds provide a good ground for studying capital lock-in: they are
largely unregulated, their lock-in terms are negotiated by sophisti-
cated venture capitalists (VCs) and institutional investors, and, it turns
out, those terms vary widely across funds. 6 I study confidential part-
nership agreements of sixty venture capital funds raised by twenty-one
U.S.-based venture capital firms between 1987 and 2005. To code the
magnitude of capital lock-in, I use Monte Carlo simulations to approx-
imate, under realistic assumptions, the cost to investors of defaulting
on their capital commitments.
This study finds significant evidence that proxies for agency costs
predict the degree of capital lock-in.7 Controlling for other things,
venture funds run by more successful managers, funds that employ
more performance-sensitive compensation schemes, and funds that
use other mechanisms of investor protection (advisory boards) lock in
their capital more tightly. Thus, on the whole, funds that confront
lesser agency problems lock in capital more tightly. I supplement re-
gression analysis with information gathered from open-ended inter-
views with VCs, attorneys, and institutional investors. The interviews
are consistent with the empirical evidence.
Part I of this Article places my assessment of capital lock-in in
venture capital partnerships in the broader context of the relationship
between investment frictions and investor withdrawal rights in a vari-
ety of industries. Part II discusses the capital lock-in mechanisms that
venture funds use. Part III describes my simulation methodology and
explains the potential advantages of the simulations method as com-
5 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976).
6 See Kate Litvak, Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and Walkaway Options in
Venture Capital Partnership Agreements, 40 WILLAME=rE L. REv. 771, 772-78 (2004).
7 1 lack proxies for self-dealing risk and therefore focus on agency costs as a predic-
tor of lock-in.
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pared to other coding methods used in the finance and economics
literatures. Part IV frames my hypotheses, Part V describes the data
and variables, and Part VI contains the results of my study. The Con-
clusion summarizes my findings.
I
INVESTMENT FRICTIONS AND INVESTOR WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS
A. Capital Lock-In as a Product of Investment Frictions
Maximum lock-in theories are based on an underspecified claim
that the risk of capital withdrawals by investors has a variety of costs,
which produce a higher cost of capital and the potential to disrupt the
firm's operations.8 But in perfect capital markets, if some investors
withdraw capital, new investors immediately step in to replace them.
The importance of capital lock-in has to flow from some economic
friction: information asymmetries (previous investors are better in-
formed about the firm than outsiders), or search costs (it takes time
and effort for a firm to find new investors), or bundling of capital and
other unique services that some investors provide (for example, VCs
supply both capital and labor to their start-ups, which means VCs are
not always interchangeable with each other or other capital suppli-
ers), or the like.
While maximum lock-in proponents do not specify what eco-
nomic friction makes capital lock-in so important, they seem to sug-
gest some combination of information asymmetry and search or
replacement costs. But if so, we should observe that the magnitude of
these market frictions varies across firms in a systematic manner, and
therefore our response to them via capital lock-in should vary corre-
spondingly. A uniformly maximum capital lock-in cannot be an opti-
mal response to variable market frictions. If we believe that capital
lock-in is a response to market frictions, we should conclude that the
extent of the lock-in should vary with proxies for frictions. This "capi-
tal market frictions" theory of lock-in is testable.
B. Existing Examples of Unlocked Capital
Many modern firms lock in their equity capital. For example,
firms typically issue nonredeemable common stock even though cor-
porate law allows them to issue stock that is puttable to the company
on demand.9 However, evidence from a variety of sources shows that
firms do not maximize capital lock-in.
8 See, e.g., Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 2, at 1348-49 (discussing how
capital withdrawal can destroy the "going-concern value" of the firm).
9 Under Delaware law, the only limitation is that the company cannot redeem every
single share it has issued. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b) (2005); see also MODEL Bus.
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Unlocked debt. While common equity is usually locked in, debt is
not: debt is redeemable through interest payments, fixed maturity,
and accelerated maturity if the firm defaults on a covenant. Indeed,
debtholders' power to demand repayment makes debt an attractive
instrument of governance. Thus, in Michael Jensen's "free cash flow"
theory, replacing voluntary dividends to equity investors with
mandatory interest and principal payments to debt investors forces
managers to make better use of capital.' 0 Thus, even conventional
firms do not maximize lock-in for all of their capital; instead, they
operate with a mix of locked and unlocked capital.
There is substantial evidence that debt maturity (and, therefore,
the degree of debt lock-in) varies across firms, with proxies for lower
agency costs predicting longer average debt maturity" and lower use
of inflexible but agency-cost-resistant project finance.12
Open-End Equity Unlocking. Once we move beyond the traditional
public company, equity capital as well as debt is often unlocked. One
familiar case of capital unlocking, which I will call "open-end unlock-
ing," involves investors contributing the firm's entire equity capital up
front but receiving the right to later withdraw their capital. For exam-
ple, open-end mutual funds allow capital withdrawals at any time.
Meanwhile, closed-end mutual funds typically trade at a discount to
their asset value. This discount disappears when a closed-end mutual
fund converts to an open-end form-a phenomenon that has created
an "open-up" takeover market.13 Evidently, unlocking a firm's capital
may create value. Agency costs are often thought to partly explain the
closed-end discount.' 4
Hedge funds offer another example of open-end unlocking.
Many hedge funds require investors to commit capital for a minimum
CORP. Acr § 6.01(c) (2) (1979) (outlining the conditions under which a class or series of
shares may be redeemable or convertible under a company's articles of incorporation).
10 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 Am. ECON. REV. 323, 324-25 (1986).
11 See Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, A Rationale for Debt Matur-
ity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework, 35 J. FIN. 1223, 1223-24
(1980); Joseph P. H. Fan, Sheridan Titman & Garry Twite, An International Comparison of
Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSis 23, 41-43
(2012); Yilmaz Guney & Aydin Ozkan, New Insights on the Importance ofAgency Costs for Corpo-
rate Debt Maturity Decisions, I APPLIED FIN. ECON. LETrERS 233, 234 (2005).
12 Krishnamurthy Subramanian & Frederick Tung, Law and Project Finance 1-2 (May
22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972415.
13 Carole Gould, Mutual Funds: Hunting the Closed-End Conversion, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26,
1990, at Fl8.
14 See Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End Mutual Funds: A
Study in Valuation, 28J. FIN. 515, 516 (1973).
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period, often two years.15 Additionally, many limit withdrawals to an-
nual or quarterly withdrawal windows.16
Open-Start Equity Unlocking, Another popular way to unlock a
firm's equity capital is by staged investment, which I will call open-start
unlocking. Staged investment is the norm for venture capital invest-
ments in portfolio companies.' 7 A venture capital fund commonly in-
vests a limited amount in a start-up company-less than the company
will need to bring its product to market.18 The fund has the right, but
no obligation, to participate when the company raises equity capital in
the future. Moreover, because of information asymmetries and other
frictions, a venture capital-backed company will often have difficulty
raising capital elsewhere if an early investor withdraws.
Staged investment generates the costs cited by lock-in propo-
nents: greater risk of liquidity shocks and bankruptcy, higher infor-
mation costs, difficulty in attracting qualified employees and
contractual partners, incentives for management to manipulate per-
formance indicators, and so forth.19 It presumably must have offset-
ting benefits, such as a greater ability to control agency costs for the
capital providers.
C. The Similarity Between Financial and Nonfinancial Firms
Many of the examples of open-end and open-start equity unlock-
ing discussed above involve mutual funds, hedge funds, or other in-
vestment firms. My data set involves another type of investment firm:
venture capital funds. Lock-in proponents might object that locking
in capital in a financial firm does not create the same problems as it
does for firms in other industries. This is incorrect: both theory and
evidence suggest that unlocked capital imposes similar types of costs
on financial and nonfinancial firms alike.
Investor ability to withdraw money on demand imposes costs in
open-end mutual funds.20 The open-end form exposes financial firms
to the risk of investor flight if short-term performance is poor. This
gives fund managers incentives to avoid trades that are attractive in
the long term but are unlikely to converge with fundamentals
quickly.21 Open-end funds "stick primarily to short-horizon strate-
15 See Hedge Funds: All Locked-Up, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2007, at 62.
16 See id.
17 See PAUL COMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 160-61 (2d ed.
2004).
18 See id. at 183-97.
19 See id. at 199.
20 See Roger M. Edelen, Investor Hows and the Assessed Performance of Open-End Mutual
Funds, 53J. FIN. ECON. 439, 440 (1999); Jeremy Stein, Why Are Most Funds Open-End? Compe-
tition and the Limits of Arbitrage, 120 Q.J. ECON. 247, 247 (2005).
21 Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 37 (2007).
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gies[ ] and earn low excess returns. In so doing, they . . . leave large
long-horizon mispricings ... mostly untouched[ ] because attacking
such mispricings aggressively would require a closed-end structure."22
Fear of investor flight might have prevented mutual fund and hedge
fund managers from betting heavily against the Internet bubble in the
late 1990s. 23
In sum, rather than simply locking in equity capital as tightly as
the law allows, firms in a number of settings use a variety of lock-in
regimes. Public firms unlock their capital principally by using a mix-
ture of equity and debt. Private firms-which are often, but not al-
ways, financial firms-use a mixture of open-end and open-start
unlocking strategies. In all areas of private equity, investors receive
some withdrawal rights that they can exercise if they are dissatisfied
with the managers' performance.
Firms that allow investor exit experience the array of problems
cited by lock-in proponents, including liquidity shocks, managerial
short-termism, incentives to manipulate performance indicators, and
higher transaction costs.24 Thus, there are presumably benefits to al-
lowing investor withdrawal that may outweigh these costs. However, I
am not aware of prior efforts to assess whether the degree of equity
capital lock-in varies with proxies for those benefits. This Article un-
dertakes that effort for venture capital funds.
II
CAPITAL LOCK-IN IN VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 2 5
A. Two Measures of Capital Lock-In in Venture Capital Funds
Investors in a venture capital fund do not pay up front the entire
amount of committed capital at once. Instead, they promise to supply
capital in stages over a number of years, retaining a real option to
default on their commitment obligation.
Many venture capital fund partnership agreements not only allow
investors to invest in stages but expressly limit the portion of commit-
ted capital that a VC can call annually as well as the purposes for
which capital calls can be made. Typically, the VC can receive the
entire committed amount only over a two- to five-year period. In
other words, part of the fund's capital is unlocked for a significant
fraction of its life, which is normally ten years. The terms of the
"walkaway" period vary across venture funds. The length of this
22 Stein, supra note 20, at 249.
23 See id. at 247 & n.2 ("[Olpen-end funds are unlikely to want to bet heavily against
something like the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s.").
24 See, e.g., Edelen, supra note 20, at 440-41 (high transaction costs); Stein, supra note
20, at 247 (liquidity shocks and managerial short-termism).
25 Portions of this section derive from my earlier article, Litvak, supra note 6.
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"walkaway" period gives us the term of the investors' put option and
provides one proxy for the degree of capital lock-in.
To induce investors to honor their commitment obligations, ven-
ture capital funds employ a variety of default penalties. An investor
who fails to contribute capital on time suffers a financial penalty, usu-
ally collected by transferring some part of the defaulter's capital ac-
count to nondefaulting investors. Default penalties vary widely across
funds, ranging from relatively modest to severe, and they give us a
second proxy for the degree of a fund's capital lock-in.
B. Limits on Annual Capital Calls
All of the partnership agreements in my sample require investors
to contribute only a small portion of committed capital (usually be-
tween five and fifteen percent) shortly before the fund makes its first
investment in a portfolio company. The remaining amount is contrib-
uted in installments over a several-year period as needed for discrete
investments. Although the VC determines the timing and amount of
each installment, more than half of the agreements in my sample con-
tain numerical caps on annual capital contributions between twenty-
five and sixty percent of committed capital. 26 The second relevant
provision requires that firms call only as much capital as they can
promptly invest.27 All of the agreements in my sample contained such
a "call-to-invest" provision.
It usually takes several years for VCs to find suitable investment
opportunities for the entire amount of committed capital. The call-to-
invest provision thus ensures that investors get a few years to decide
whether they want to invest the entire committed amount. To be
sure, unless they are restricted by a numerical cap, VCs can accelerate
capital contributions by investing quickly. However, few VCs would be
willing to rush to invest by cutting the normal investigative stage short
(thereby jeopardizing the fund's profitability) solely to accelerate cap-
ital contributions. Thus, in real life, the call-to-invest provision usually
gives investors at least two years to make up their minds-and often, it
gives them substantially more time. A conservative estimate of this
26 Most agreements in my sample also limit VCs' ability to delay capital calls. One
popular arrangement is the "use it or lose it" provision, which states that investors are not
required to make capital contributions after a certain date (usually between the fourth and
the seventh anniversaries of the fund's formation). This rule ensures that the fund does
not pick up new projects so late in its life that they are unlikely be completed by the time of
the fund's scheduled liquidation. Some agreements also ban investing into new companies
after a certain date.
27 Many agreements in my sample specify a minimum capital call-usually between five
and fifteen percent of committed capital-likely to reduce nuisance to investors. Agree-
ments that specify a minimum size of capital calls are unclear on what should happen if the
specified minimum is more than the amount that a venture capital fund can promptly
invest. Presumably, the lesser amount would govern.
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provision's bite would be to treat it as a sixty percent cap on annual
calls.28
Figure 1 summarizes the caps on annual contributions found in
the agreements that I studied. I code agreements that do not contain
formal caps but still have qualitative call-to-invest caps as having sixty
percent caps.
FIGURE 1. DEFAULT PENALTIES AND CAPITAL CALL LIMITS
40
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59
ODefault Penalty Coecfiient ECap on Callable Capital a Percentage of Committed Capital
Figure 1 shows, for each fund in my sample, the default penalty coefficient and the maximum
amount of capital callable annually, as a percent of committed capital. The default penalty
coefficient is from simulations described in the text. Funds with no restriction on capital calls
are coded as having a sixty percent annual limit.
C. The Use of Default Penalties
All of the partnership agreements in my sample specify that the
failure of limited partners (LPs) to contribute capital on time may
result in a penalty, which the general partner may invoke at its discre-
tion. Instead of listing a single penalty, all of my agreements specify
several penalties of different harshness, ranging from mild (such as
charging a high interest rate on delayed contributions) to severe
(such as expelling the defaulter from the fund and compelling the
forfeiture of the defaulter's entire interest). All of the agreements ex-
plicitly give VCs full discretion to select any penalty or combination of
penalties from the list.
28 As a robustness check, I reran all regressions treating funds without numerical caps
as having a fifty percent cap; the results remained very similar (not reported).
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The option to choose among multiple available penalties is valua-
ble. It allows VCs to tailor the punishment to the perceived serious-
ness of the noncontribution offense, taking into account both the
damage a specific noncontribution causes to the fund and the de-
faulter's apparent blameworthiness. For example, some LPs are le-
gally prohibited from making certain types of investments; in
interviews, VCs told me that they routinely excuse noncontribution in
such cases even if it causes significant difficulties in the fund's ability
to invest on a tight schedule.29 Likewise, the choice of penalties allows
VCs to punish an LP whose default results from unexpected liquidity
problems less severely than one whose default appears to be opportu-
nistic and in bad faith.
Another important consideration in the choice of penalties is
that some LPs provide nonfinancial contributions to the fund in the
form of prestige, visibility, connections, and such. These LPs receive
special treatment in many ways, including softer reactions to their de-
lays in making contributions.
Finally, the ability to apply multiple punishments in a sequence
allows VCs to separate the cases where the goal of using the penalty is
to pressure the defaulter into contributing from the cases where the
goal is to induce nondefaulting investors to cover the shortfall. Slap-
ping the defaulter with the biggest available penalty outright (say, by
forcibly repurchasing the defaulter's stake in the fund at a low price)
benefits nondefaulting LPs and induces them to contribute beyond
what they have committed. This is so because, by volunteering to in-
crease their contributions, the nondefaulting LPs will be able to cap-
ture a larger portion of the defaulter's foregone capital. However,
doing so does nothing to convince the defaulter to contribute. In
contrast, starting with a low penalty and threatening to increase it is a
good way to pressure the defaulter into contributing, but it does not
incentivize nondefaulting LPs to quickly step in to cover the shortfall.
In my interviews, some VCs expressed the worry that if they do
not credibly threaten a serious punishment for default, not only
would they not be able to make time-sensitive investments but they
also might encounter various "run on the bank" situations. In the ex-
treme case, each default would make other defaults more attractive,
starting the downward spiral for the fund even when the first default
was entirely unrelated to the fund's performance. In the less extreme
version, the soft treatment of defaulters would change LPs' decision
making: each LP would make its contribution decisions by not only
looking at the objective attractiveness of a particular investment or at
some measures of a venture fund's performance but also considering
29 Some agreements in my sample make this decision even more straightforward by
including a separate section excusing LPs from making such contributions.
2013] 1505
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the likelihood of other LPs failing to contribute. In this way, an LP's
error in forecasting other LPs' behavior, rather than anything a VC
has done, might cause additional defaults and delays.
One may think of even more complex scenarios in which LPs
would simultaneously consider the choice of defaulting first (to avoid
becoming the last investor in an overrun bank) or defaulting last (to
collect the penalties levied by the general partner on earlier default-
ers). But in my interviews, VCs and LPs said that they had not en-
countered such complicated gaming.
D. The Enforceability of Default Penalties
U.S. contract law does not enforce penalty provisions, but it does
enforce liquidated-damages provisions so long as the damages are set
"at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual loss caused by the breach . . . . A term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public pol-
icy as a penalty."30 Thus, attempting to make default provisions en-
forceable, partnership agreements often go to great pains to avoid
using the word "penalty." Further, they often express that the injury
from noncontribution is significant and uncertain and that the
amount is reasonable. The following is an example:
Parties agree that this is a fair and reasonable remedy in light of the
fact that it is impractical to ascertain the actual damages that would
be incurred by the Partnership and the non-defaulting Limited
Partners as a result of a [defaulter's] failure to pay its capital com-
mitment when due.3'
Some agreements avoid the issue of nonenforceability of liqui-
dated damages by framing the penalty as an option that all LPs grant
to each other, which is exercisable by nondefaulting LPs at the time of
someone's default. An example of a provision like this is the
following:
Until unpaid contribution and interest is paid fully ... Partnership
has an option, but not the obligation, in its sole discretion to ac-
quire the partnership interest of [defaulter] as following: [de-
faulter] is treated as optionor . . . The aggregate price for
[defaulter's] interest is [description]. The option is exercisable at
any time within 30 days following 10 days after default.32
Or:
[S]hould any defaulting Limited Partner fail to make any of the
contributions .. . such Limited Partner shall be in default and the
o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 356(1) (1981).
31 Partnership agreement for a fund raised by a venture capital firm in California.
32 Partnership agreement for a fund raised by a venture capital firm in California.
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other Limited Partners (the "Optionees") ... shall have the right
and option to acquire the Partnership interest of the defaulting
Limited Partner (the "Optionor") [at the described price].3
Unlike contract law, business-organization law expressly allows
the use of penalties for noncontribution. Delaware limited partner-
ship law, for example, provides that:
A partnership agreement may provide that the interest of any part-
ner who fails to make any contribution that he or she is obligated to
make shall be subject to specified penalties for, or specified conse-
quences of, such failure. Such penalty or consequence may take the
form of reducing or eliminating the defaulting partner's propor-
tionate interest in the limited partnership, subordinating the part-
nership interest to that of nondefaulting partners, a forced sale of
his or her partnership interest, forfeiture of that partnership inter-
est, ... a fixing of the value of that partnership interest by appraisal
or by formula and redemption or sale of the partnership interest at
such value, or other penalty or consequence.84
III
USING MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS TO CODE LEGAL
VARIABLES
As mentioned before, this Article seeks to make two principal
contributions. The first, introduced above, is substantive: I assess
whether proxies for agency costs predict the degree of capital lock-in
in venture capital funds. The second is methodological and is intro-
duced in this section. Here, I develop a simulation methodology for
coding the relative economic importance of contract terms and apply
the methodology to code the severity of the default penalties found in
venture capital partnership agreements. This approach can poten-
tially be extended to other areas in which researchers code contrac-
tual terms or legal rules.
A. Existing Coding Systems and Their Weaknesses
I use the severity of the default penalties in partnership agree-
ments as a proxy for the degree of capital lock-in. To do so, I need to
code the magnitude of penalties. This coding is difficult for several
reasons: First, each agreement uses multiple penalties. Second, the
severity of each penalty depends on many factors: the amount that an
investor contributed before the default, the fund's pre-default profit-
ability, the fraction of the investor's initial commitment that has al-
ready been paid, the fund's expected future profitability, investors'
33 Partnership agreement for a fund raised by a venture capital firm in Massachusetts.
34 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-502(c) (2005).
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opportunity costs, and so forth. Any coding of default penalties is
therefore only an approximation of the comparative harshness of
each penalty.
This coding problem is widespread in the finance, economics,
and law literatures.35 It usually arises whenever one needs to estimate
the value of a contractual or statutory term, regulatory scheme, orju-
dicially imposed rule. For example, how important are restrictive cov-
enants (e.g., restrictions on transfers of partnership interests) in a
private company's partnership agreement? How valuable is a complex
provision that allocates particular risks in a long-term contract? How
valuable are the antidilution protections that a country's corporate
law provides to minority shareholders? How well do particular con-
tract-damages rules protect against contractual nonperformance?
One common solution is to virtually give up: to specify which con-
tractual or statutory provisions are relevant to the research question,
count each of them as "1," and use the sum as a cardinal measure. A
contract, statute, or regulation that includes the highest number of
provisions that a researcher deems "relevant" and desirable is consid-
ered the best. Prior studies of covenants in venture capital partner-
ship agreements take this counting approach.3 6 Provisions that are
substantively strong count the same as provisions that are weak, sym-
bolic, or redundant, or that merely repeat legal requirements.
The counting approach is unsatisfying. If one sums the number
of covenants presumed to be good for investors (such as a restriction
on a venture capital fund's reinvestment of profits or the presence of
an advisory board) and subtracts the number of limitations on trans-
fers of partnership interests, which are presumed to be bad, the result-
ing variable likely has little substantive meaning. Moreover, the
outcome of a simple count of good and bad provisions is sensitive to
drafting verbosity and overvalues a series of specific, narrow provisions
relative to broader blanket provisions. Between two substantively
identical contracts or statutes, the more verbose one will likely receive
35 See Paul Gompers,Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 113 (2003); Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A
Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CoRP. L. STUD. 17, 22 (2007); Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal
Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 1 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 59,
80 (2000); see also, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corpo-
rate Governance, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009); Bernard S. Black, HasungJang & Woochan
Kim, Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms'Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 366 (2006); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law
and Finance]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in
Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Securities Laws].
36 See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Ven-
ture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463, 485 (1996); Josh Lerner & Antoinette
Schoar, The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidencefrom Private Equity, 72 J. FIN. EcoN. 3, 18-19
(2004).
1508 [Vol. 98:1495
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
a higher rating. The counting approach also doesn't capture the
magnitude of individual provisions or their interrelationship.
Law and finance scholarship often uses count-based indices as
cardinal measures of statutory or contractual quality. The widely used
LLSV shareholder protection index uses six variables as proxies for
shareholder and creditor rights, adding them up to obtain a
country-level measure.37 Their measure of the quality of securities
laws uses a largely similar counting approach.38 Criticisms of LLSV
and similar indices usually involve dissatisfaction with the elements of
the index or questions of whether they counted correctly but not with
the counting methodology itself.39
Similar methods are dominant in evaluations of corporate gov-
ernance. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's "GIM" index of
U.S. company-level antitakeover protections simply counts the num-
ber of protections.40 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell criticize the GIM
index for counting the wrong provisions and argue that one should
count only six provisions instead of the twenty-four in the GIM in-
dex. 41 Other country-level corporate governance indices are usually
constructed in similar ways. Another example is the Korean index de-
veloped by Black, Jang, and Kim, 42 which combines governance attrib-
utes into five groups, counts the number of provisions in each group
to obtain a group measure, and then sums the group measures.
Overall, the chosen counting method seems to generate indices
that are inevitably nonrobust and dependent on the choice of which
measures to count. In contrast, the simulation approach developed
below seeks to assign cardinal values to specific contractual provisions,
using information about the magnitude of individual provisions and
allowing for interplay among them. This approach helps the re-
searcher quantify provisions that are not intuitively quantifiable, com-
pare different rules, and quantify trade-offs within and across different
provisions.
The simulation results depend, of course, on assumptions about
various parameters, but these assumptions can be generated based on
empirical data and subjected to sensitivity tests. Thus, when the data
needed for the simulation approach are available, simulations offer
the potential for a more nuanced measure of the importance of con-
tractual or legal provisions.
37 See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 35, at 1126-40.
38 See La Porta et al., Securities Laws, supra note 35, at 9.
39 See, e.g., Lele & Siems, supra note 35, at 18-21; Pistor, supra note 35, at 62.
40 Gompers et al., supra note 35, at 108-09.
41 Bebchuk et al., supra note 35, at 794.
42 Black et al., supra note 35, at 370.
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B. Coding Default Penalties in Venture Capital Agreements
I estimate the value of each default penalty as follows. First, I
code each default penalty found in my agreements as a formula whose
value depends on the amount of capital contributed prior to default
(x,), the value of the capital account at the time of default (vc,), the
fund's future profitability as a fraction of contributed capital (profit),
and the penalty interest rate paid on late contributions (R) from date
of default until date paid. To generate distributions of the unknowns
x,, vce, and profit, I use real data on profitability, investment schedules,
and payout schedules of venture capital funds raised in the same years
as the funds in my sample. These data were provided to me privately
by Susan Woodward of Sand Hill Econometrics, a leading organiza-
tion collecting and analyzing data on venture capital performance.4 3
The Appendix compares actual to simulated capital account values at
the end of fund years 1-4 to illustrate the process of simulations. Fi-
nally, I run Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the relative severity of
each penalty formula by randomly pulling the values of relevant
unknowns out of the Sand Hill Econometrics distributions and plug-
ging them into each formula.
For simulation purposes, I make the following realistic
assumptions:
* Fund Life. Each fund has a ten-year life. All investments occur
during years 1-5; all profits are earned during years 6-10.
* When Default Occurs. A default, if it occurs, does so at the end of
years 1-4 of the fund's life. To model this, I assume that the
probability of default follows a Poisson distribution with A = 2.
The results are qualitatively similar when I use other, similar val-
ues of A.
* Investment Schedule. The fund follows an average (for all funds in
the Sand Hill Econometrics dataset) schedule of investments
during the investment period. Drawing from the Sand Hill
Econometrics data, I assume that at the end of year 1 (2/3/4/5),
17.1% (38.0%/64.3%/84.3%/100%) of committed capital has
been invested. For simplicity, I assume that all investments are
made at the beginning of the year. Thus, investors invest 17.1%
of total committed capital at the beginning of year 1, an addi-
tional 20.9% at the beginning of year 2, and so on.
* Value of Capital Account. The value of the defaulter's capital ac-
count at the time of default vc, is drawn randomly from a distri-
bution of venture fund valuations for year t during the
investment period, obtained from Sand Hill Econometrics. For
each year, I assume those valuations are normally distributed,
43 Due to the confidentiality of this information, the data set itself will not be pub-
lished. The Cornell Law Review has not reviewed the data set.
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with the following mean and standard deviations for a one dollar
investment:
Year Mean Standard Deviation
1 1.385 0.4023
2 1.7798 0.7525
3 2.0751 0.9723
4 2.2772 0.9416
Profit over Fund Lifetime. Profits are earned after the end of the
investment period and therefore are unknown at the time of de-
fault. I therefore draw these values randomly from a distribution
of venture fund profits based on all funds in the Sand Hill
Econometrics dataset. I compute profit as the difference be-
tween the final value of the capital account and the total amount
contributed.
For each default penalty found in my sample, I assume an initial
capital commitment of ten, invested over the first five years of the
fund's life according to the investment schedule noted above. To de-
termine the value of that investment, I sample 80,000 times (20,000
times for each of years 1-4) from the value of capital account and
fund profit distributions, and I estimate the cost of default to the in-
vestor for each sampling event. I then compute the mean loss for a
default in year t, bring this mean loss back to present value at the time
of the fund's formation, and compute the expected present cost of a
default based on the probability of default at the different times set
forth above. I term the resulting value the "default penalty coeffi-
cient." A higher coefficient indicates a higher expected loss from de-
fault and therefore a more severe penalty.
In Table 1, the second column describes each default penalty
found in my agreements, the third column contains the formula for
that penalty used in the simulations, and the fourth column presents
the default penalty coefficient. The final column presents, for com-
parison, a rough, subjective estimate of the severity of each default
penalty, which I prepared prior to conducting any simulations. There
is a reasonable but imperfect correspondence between this "smell
test" estimate and the simulation-based coefficient.
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TABLE 1. SEVERTIY MEASURES FOR DEFAULT PENALTIES
Table 1 lists default penalties found in a sample of sixty venture capital fund partnership agree-
ments for funds raised by twenty-one venture firms from 1987 to 2005. In the third column, x =
amount of prior capital contributions (total contribution = 10 over first 5 years of fund's life);
profit = (accounting) profit rate on investments, vc = value of capital account at time of default,
R = penalty interest rate on contributions owed but not made. Profits are assumed to be earned
after all contributions are complete. The fourth column indicates my subjective evaluation of
the severity of each penalty before conducting the simulations.
Rule Expected Loss Default Penalty Default Penalty
No. Default Penalty from Default (Monte Carlo) ("Smell Test")
1 Defaulter is excused from making this contribu- 0 0 0
tion. This (non)penalty is reserved for investors
who cannot make a particular contribution be-
cause of legal restrictions.
2 Defaulter's capital account is reduced by 25%. 0.25*(x + 2.57 2
profit*x)
3 Defaulter keeps capital account; forfeits 50% of 0.5*(profit*x) 2.80 3
future profits.
4 Defaulter owes high interest rate R on uncon- min((10-x) ** 4.96 3
tributed amount until contributed. R - (10 - x),
x+ profit*x)
5 Defaulter's capital account is reduced by 50%. De- 0.5*(x + prof- 5.15 4
faulter's share of future profits is reduced by 50%. it*x)
6 Defaulter's capital contribution is reduced by x + 0.5*(prof- 6.57 5
100%; capital account is reduced by 50%. it*x)
7 Defaulter's interest is repurchased at a price equal profit*x 7.39 7
to his capital contribution. The payment is made
at the time of a fund's liquidation.
8 Defaulter's interest is repurchased at lesser of cap- x + profit*x - 8.26 8
ital contribution or value of capital account. The min(vc, x)
payment is made at the time of a fund's liquida-
tion.
9 Defaulter's interest is repurchased at the price x + profit*x - 6.46 7
equal to the value of his capital account. The pay- vc
ment is made at the time of a fund's liquidation.
10 Defaulter's interest is repurchased at 70% of the x + profit*x - 7.46 9
lesser of value of its capital account or original (0.7*(min(vc,
contribution. The payment is made at the time of x)))
a fund's liquidation.
11 Defaulter's account is reduced to zero. x + profit*x 14.07 10
Most fund agreements contain multiple default penalties.44  To
each fund, I assign a default penalty coefficient corresponding to the
maximum penalty specified in its agreement. This seems appropriate
because even if a default occurs and the VCs agree to impose less than
the maximum penalty, the parties nonetheless conduct their settle-
ment negotiations in the shadow of the largest available penalty.
44 See Jay S. Rand & Allen L. Weingarten, When Limited Partners Default, 5 J. PRvATE
EQurry 31, 32 (2002).
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IV
HYPOTHESES4 5
A. Existing Explanations for the Current Practice of Staged
Capital Contributions
As discussed in Part I, the current system of staged capital contri-
butions is far from ideal because it exposes the fund to liquidity
shocks. It also adds the costs of administering capital calls, respond-
ing to noncontributions, and looking for alternative sources of fund-
ing in cases of default.46 One simple solution is to require all
contributions to be made up front.
The usual response to this suggestion is that venture funds do not
collect all committed capital up front because they do not need it:
they invest in stages, and some investments are made years after the
fund is formed.47 This is true, but it does not mean that venture capi-
tal funds should not collect the entire committed amount up front.
Venture capital funds can place the collected capital in escrow or in-
vest it in liquid assets until they need it for investment. This strategy
alone would eliminate default risk and reduce liquidity shocks at a low
cost. One would expect this to be standard practice, but it is not-in
my sample, only one fund (an unusual, very prestigious one) has a
semblance of such a system. This fund gives VCs full discretion to
require high-default-risk investors-individuals, institutions with assets
below $100 million, and LPs who have previously defaulted-to con-
tribute up to fifty percent of their commitments to a special escrow
account, allocating interest to the contributing investor. Notice that
even in this unusual case, the up-front contribution is entirely within
the general partner's discretion, does not apply to all LPs, and does
not cover the entire amount of committed capital.
The next-most-popular explanation that emerged in my inter-
views is that staged capital contributions are used to manipulate the
funds' internal rate of return (IRR). IRR is a critically important per-
formance indicator for venture organizations that seek to raise new
funds, and it is calculated on the basis of capital that LPs actually con-
tributed rather than on the basis of capital that they promised to con-
tribute in the future.48 The more capital is sitting idly in a fund's
escrow account, the lower the fund's performance statistics (assuming,
of course, that a fund's venture investments are on average more prof-
itable than passive investments held in liquid assets, which is not the
45 Portions of this section are based on interviews originally discussed in Litvak, supra
note 6, at 794-97.
46 See Part II, supra.
47 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 17, at 157.
48 See Bronwyn Dylla Bailey & Aaron Gershenberg, Assessing Fund Perfomance: Using
Benchmarks in Venture Capital, VENTURE CAPITAL UPDATE (SVB Capital), May 2008, at 2.
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case for many funds). Therefore, a fund that collects more capital
than it can immediately invest damages its own performance markers.
This story strikes me as implausible given the major participants
in the venture capital industry. .Sophisticated institutional investors,
who contribute most of the capital to venture funds in my sample, are
surely capable of using different bases for calculating IRR, including
the "invested capital" basis. For example, partnership agreements in
my sample routinely specify that the main component of VC compen-
sation-carried interest-is to be calculated on the basis of profits
made only from the fund's investment in portfolio companies. This
calculation is not to be based on the interest earned by "idle fund"
investments, meaning capital that is temporarily placed in liquid se-
curities while the fund is preparing to make an investment in portfolio
companies. Many agreements in my sample also specifically exclude
"idle funds" capital from calculations of management fees. The idea
behind this restriction is that the management of passively held liquid
investments is a nearly commoditized service provided by a highly
competitive market at a low price; paying VCs for this service at the
rate they charge for their specialized work of managing venture invest-
ments is undesirable because it would reduce the sensitivity of VC
compensation to the performance of the portfolio companies. 49
One may object that there is something artificial and meaningless
about the calculation of IRR on the basis of capital invested in portfo-
lio companies rather than on the basis of capital handed over to the
fund. After all, investors care about the return over the entire period
in which they relinquish control of capital to an investment profes-
sional, not for some arbitrary shorter term within that period. That is
true, but recall that legally, LPs relinquish control over their funds at
the time when they sign a binding commitment to contribute capital
on a short notice within a specified number of years. To meet this
legal obligation, LPs must significantly restrict their use of committed
funds, limiting it to highly liquid investments-that is, they must place
committed capital in pools of idle fund investments that are similar to
those that venture capital funds use when they collect capital that they
cannot immediately invest. It makes no sense to treat identical idle
funds differently for IRR calculations merely because in one case the
idle fund is managed by the same party who will manage its nonidle
49 Some interviewees also opined that it would be "unfair" for VCs to charge their
high fees to manage idle fund investments that could be managed very cheaply by others. I
remain agnostic on the issue of fairness here because the privilege to invest in venture
funds, under U.S. securities laws, is limited to sophisticated parties who can fend for them-
selves. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2012). Some investors may well find it appropriate
to pay VCs a high fee for managing idle funds instead of raising other portions of VC
compensation; however, this is likely a bad idea because, as mentioned above, it reduces a
VC's pay-performance sensitivity, which is probably why we do not normally observe it.
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use (a VC) and in the other case it is managed by an unrelated third
party.
A bigger problem with this hypothesis is that it predicts that VCs
should want to limit capital contributions to the minimum necessary
amounts to help inflate their performance indicators, while LPs
should want to invest the maximum amount up front to ensure that
venture capital funds do not face liquidity shocks. But venture capital
fund partnership agreements do nothing to address this conflict. The
agreements prohibit VCs from calling more capital than they can im-
mediately invest, which has no bite because an opportunistic, IRR-in-
flating VC would not want to do this anyway. To address the VC-
driven IRR-manipulation problem, partnership agreements would
need the opposite provision-a requirement of full, up-front contri-
bution. This has not happened.
Tojustify the current practice on IRR-manipulation grounds, one
would need to think of a more complicated institutional or agency
story, where the cause of friction is LPs rather than VCs. Some of the
industry participants I interviewed told versions of this story. Institu-
tional investors, who supply most of the capital to the funds in my
sample, employ different people to manage venture and nonventure
investments. Individuals responsible for venture investments presum-
ably care deeply about the returns on their investments for internal
evaluation purposes, and so they seek to isolate those returns from
nonventure investments. An ideal employee-evaluation system would
take into account the fact that the committed but not yet contributed
capital must be placed in short-term liquid investments with an IRR of
nearly zero and therefore should be counted towards the total IRR
from the overall venture portfolio. But in some institutions, internal-
evaluations systems may not do this. Instead, their compensation sys-
tems count contributed capital sitting in venture capital funds' pools
of idle funds differently from committed but uncontributed capital
sitting in an institution's own idle fund. In such cases, employees of
LPs have a strong incentive not to make contributions until the last
minute.
This is a possible, but likely only partial, explanation. It begs the
question of why LP employees' compensation systems could be struc-
tured that way. As mentioned above, most venture funds already sepa-
rate the contributed capital sitting in idle funds from the contributed
capital already invested in portfolio companies. It is not clear why
institutions investing in venture capital funds can successfully use this
unbundling to compensate VCs but not to compensate their own
employees.
A different LP-based explanation is that institutional investors do
a better job of investing committed capital internally than a VC would
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in an idle funds venture fund pool. This view lacks empirical support
in the finance literature. Moreover, even if it were empirically sup-
ported, one could easily design a scheme where LPs would be allowed
to manage their own portions of idle fund pools sitting in venture
funds, provided that they maintain the requisite levels of liquidity and
risk.
Yet another LP-based explanation is that investors may have lim-
ited liquidity. Some LPs may not be able to provide the entire amount
of committed capital up front because they don't have the funds to do
so and, for a variety of reasons (such as regulatory restrictions, taxes,
or imperfect markets), cannot borrow against funds available in the
future. This hypothesis is not entirely convincing, either, primarily
because the heterogeneity among investors would predict heterogene-
ity in capital-contributions provisions. Most investors in my sample
funds are large institutions that invest in multiple private equity funds
each year; they are not likely to have these kinds of short-term liquid-
ity problems. And even if some do, their illiquidity is a cost they im-
pose on the venture capital fund and on other LPs. When one
investor in a joint enterprise imposes a higher cost on the others, the
solution is not to treat everyone else as imposing similarly high costs
but rather to treat high-cost participants differently. If investor illi-
quidity were the culprit here, we would expect substantial heterogene-
ity in responses: Some venture capitalists would refuse to admit low-
liquidity investors. Others would admit them, but they would do so on
less attractive terms than those offered to LPs who are willing to con-
tribute the entire committed capital up front so as to compensate for
the risk of default. Yet still others would raise separate funds for inves-
tors who are willing to contribute up front and those who are not.
However, I do not observe such heterogeneity in responses.
B. Staged Contribution as a Real Option
An alternative view on structuring capital commitments as series
of capital calls is to treat them as a staged investment by LPs in venture
capital funds, similar in form and purpose to staged investment in
many other settings, including staged investment by venture funds in
portfolio companies. Much as venture funds do not invest up front
the entire amount that their portfolio companies may need in the fu-
ture, LPs do not invest up front the entire amount their venture capi-
tal funds may need.50 By not handing over the entire committed
capital up front, LPs retain a real option to default on their funding
obligations. So long as an investor remains an LP, it can exercise this
50 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 17, at 10-14.
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option during the entirety of each capital call at the price of paying
the penalty for default.
This option is valuable for the same reasons that other options
not to extend financing are valuable. The first is VC screening: staged
investment deters low-quality applicants from seeking funding be-
cause applicants know that even if they can fool an investor in the first
round of financing, they will likely not succeed at doing so in the later
rounds. This makes seeking funding marginally less attractive to low-
quality applicants.
A second, related purpose is investor screening: VCs who particu-
larly care about the timeliness of capital contributions (because of the
characteristics of their portfolio companies, the characteristics of their
syndicates, or their own business models) can screen out investors
who have private information about their own potential liquidity
shocks by offering severe default penalties. That is, VCs can use de-
fault penalties to induce investors to separate themselves into groups
based on potential liquidity problems. This is valuable because hid-
den liquidity problems are hard for outsiders to identify. This mecha-
nism is similar to the use of management compensation structure and
transferability restrictions to screen out shallow-pocket investors.51 To
be sure, VCs could remove some of the highest-risk investors by de-
manding the entire amount of contribution up front. But this ap-
proach is blunt and inflexible because it treats low-risk investors the
same way as high-risk investors rather than separating them into dif-
ferent pools and treating them differently by allowing them to invest
on different terms.
A third purpose of the real option to default is signaling. A new
venture capital organization might not have reliable quality indicators,
but it might have private information about its own high quality based
on its expertise, its connections, the quality of its team, or its dedica-
tion. Such an organization can signal its quality by volunteering to
offer investors particularly attractive options to default-long in dura-
tion, with frequent exercise chances and a low exercise price.
A fourth purpose is to help mitigate the moral hazard problem.
Financing an entire project up front dampens the VCs' incentives to
perform after the money is contributed. Staged investment reduces
this problem by allowing LPs to evaluate the project and punish poor
performance by withdrawing funding in multiple stages.
As discussed above, however, the option to default is not costless
because it raises the risk that the fund will experience liquidity shocks.
It also increases the costs associated with midstream capital raising
51 See Lerner & Schoar, supra note 36, at 8; Vikram Nanda, M.P. Narayanan & Vincent
A. Warther, Liquidity, Investment Ability, and Mutual Fund Structure, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 417,
418-19 (2000).
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and covering shortfalls. Thus, one would expect venture funds to is-
sue options to default reflecting these trade-offs rather than offering
one of the extremes of no investor ability to walk away after making a
capital commitment on the one hand and full ability to walk away
without incurring additional costs on the other.
C. Specific Hypotheses
Hypothesis #1: Quality of the Venture Capital Firm. VCs who have a
history of superior performance need less direct control from inves-
tors. Less accomplished VCs may need to be controlled more tightly
and consistently via the threat of investor withdrawal. Therefore, ven-
ture firms that have a higher proportion of successful companies and
a lower proportion of failed companies (adjusted for the year of a
fund's vintage) should have tighter withdrawal policies in the form of
higher default penalties and shorter option terms. Another proxy for
VC quality is the cumulative size of all funds that a venture capital firm
raised. We would expect larger venture organizations to have higher
default penalties and shorter option terms.
Hypothesis #2: Riskiness of VC Compensation. VCs whose overall
compensation packages contain a higher proportion of performance-
based compensation have stronger incentives to work hard and thus
need less control from the threat of investor withdrawal. Therefore,
funds where carried interest52 is lower and the management fee53 is
higher should have more liberal withdrawal policies-that is, lower
default penalties and longer option terms.
Hypothesis #3: Alternative Governance Devices. Where investors have
other means to participate in a fund's governance, withdrawal be-
comes less valuable as a governance tool. Some venture funds volun-
tarily institute advisory boards to serve as quasi-governing bodies.
Advisory boards are composed of large investors who meet periodi-
cally, receive detailed information about the fund's performance, and
are generally consulted in contested matters such as valuations of
portfolio companies and approvals of possibly conflicted transactions.
Thus, funds that have advisory boards should have higher default pen-
alties and shorter option terms.
52 The risky portion of VC compensation, calculated as a percentage of a fund's
profits.
53 The nonrisky portion of VC compensation, calculated as a percentage of a fund's
committed capital and paid regardless of the fund's performance.
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V
DATA AND VARIABLES
A. Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics. The sample consists of sixty
venture capital fund agreements raised by twenty-one venture capital
firms. All of the funds are U.S.-based and specialize in venture capital
as opposed to buyout or other forms of private equity. All of the
agreements are confidential; therefore, I cannot disclose the names of
the funds and must limit the information I disclose to prevent identifi-
cation. I collected the agreements from institutional and individual
investors as well as directly from VCs. The sample size, while small, is
similar to those used in other studies of partnership agreements.54
The sample is not random. Given my sources, I likely oversampled
higher-quality, older venture capital organizations. However, this
should not be a problem. Because my hypotheses are based on cap-
turing the effect of venture capital firm quality on fund characteris-
tics, limiting the sample to firms of similar quality should bias against
finding the results, producing a conservative estimate.
I collected supplemental information, such as the location and
the age of a venture capital firm, from a variety of other sources, in-
cluding the VentureXpert database (a large commercial database),
firms' websites, and interviews with practitioners. To maintain the an-
onymity of the funds in my study, I report descriptive statistics for the
seventy-fifth, fiftieth, and twenty-fifth percentiles rather than the mini-
mum and maximum, which could permit identification of very old or
large venture capital firms.
The venture capital funds and venture firms in my sample are
diverse. Some venture capital firms are young organizations; others
have been in business for decades. The sequence number of the
funds-the seventy-fifth percentile is six; the twenty-fifth percentile is
three-indicates this diversity. The oldest venture capital firm was
created in the 1960s, the youngest after 2000, with the median year of
creation being 1981.
The data set mostly contains recent agreements. The oldest fund
was raised in the 1980s, the most recent after 2000, with the mean
being 1998. Fund sizes range from under $100 million to over $1 bil-
lion, with the mean being $317.6 million.
The data set contains twenty-one "families" of funds. Each family
is raised by the same venture capital firm. The number of funds per
family ranges from one to over ten, and the mean is six. The venture
firms in my sample differ widely in the amount of capital they raise.
54 See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, supra note 36, at 464.
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TABLE 2. SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
Characteristics of venture capital funds and venture capital firms in my sample. The sample
consists of sixty U.S. venture capital partnerships raised by twenty-one venture firms.
75 Percentile 25 Percentile Mean Median
Fund Size, $M 500 98.5 317.650 185.35
Fund Number 6 3 5.067 5
Year When Venture Capital Firm Was Founded 1989 1979 1982.4 1981
Total Amount Raised by Firm, $M 2489 1075.7 1906.962 1652.300
Fund Vintage Year 2000 1996 1997.167 1999
Total Number of Funds Raised by Venture Capital Firm 9 4 6.6 6.5
Venture Capital Firm Age When Fund Was Raised 21.5 3.5 14 15
Dollars Raised per Year Venture Capital Firm Existence,
$M 145.4 54.4 98.1 78.6
Number of Funds per Year of Venture Capital
Existence 0.400 0.278 0.342 0.346
Number of Companies per Year of Venture Capital
Firm Existence 10.873 5.154 8.039 7.188
Total Number of Companies by Venture Capital Firm 238.5 102 196.818 197.5
Total Number of Successful Companies by Firm 119 28 95.333 85
Failed Companies by Firm (Defunct or Bankrupt) 37 9 27.143 21
Ratio of Successful to All Companies by Firm 0.518 0.366 0.429 0.475
Ratio of Successful to Failed Companies by Firm 4.667 2.563 3.621 3.464
Average Investment per Company by Firm, $M 7.3 5.0 6.2 5.7
Number of IPOs per Firm 34 12 28.238 22
Advisory Board 1 0 0.619 1
Presence of Numeric Cap on Callable Capital 1 0 0.571 1
Default Penalty, from Simulations 8.2196 6.546 7.0069 7.354
Management Fee over II Years, NPV as % of
Committed Capital 15.006 12.289 13.450 13.883
Carried Interest, % Profits 25 20 22.584 20
% Committed Capital Callable Annually 55 33 42.985 40
The top quartile of venture capital firms, as measured by fundraising,
raise almost $200 million per year of a firm's existence, while the bot-
tom quartile of firms raise less than $50 million. Likewise, top-quartile
firms raise new funds every two years; bottom-quartile firms raise
funds every five years.
Venture capital firms and funds in my sample also differ widely in
terms of their performance. Top-quartile firms add more than ten
new companies to their portfolios each year; bottom-quartile firms
add less than five. Top-quartile firms funded more than one hundred
young companies that were successful-meaning that they went pub-
lic, were acquired, or merged with other firms. Bottom-quartile ven-
ture capital firms had fewer than thirty successes. The median
number of IPOs for each firm is twenty-two, but the actual numbers
range from over forty to under ten. These numbers again demon-
strate that while there is a fair amount of diversity across firms in my
sample, older and better-established firms are overrepresented.
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A majority of venture capital funds have advisory boards. A
smaller majority have numeric caps restricting the amounts of annual
capital calls. Management fees range from under 10% of the fund's
committed capital to over 15%, and carried interest rates ranging
from under 20% of profits to 30%.
B. Variables
Default Penalty Coefficient, Simulations Result. I run Monte Carlo
simulations to estimate the default penalty coefficient for each penalty
listed in my partnership agreements. I assigned each fund in the sam-
ple a penalty coefficient corresponding to the most severe default
penalty listed in its agreement. As discussed in Part III.B, the default
penalty coefficient quantifies the magnitude of an expected loss from
default; therefore, a higher default penalty coefficient corresponds to
a more severe penalty.
Penalty Coefficient, "Smell Test." As a robustness check, I use a
rough, subjective ordinal ranking of default penalties on a scale from
zero to ten, with ten being the harshest penalty. I then treat these
ordinal rankings as cardinal measures of the magnitude of penalty.5 5
Again, I assign each fund in the sample a penalty coefficient corre-
sponding to the most severe default penalty listed in its agreement. A
higher penalty coefficient corresponds to a more severe penalty.
Callable Capital. This is the percentage of committed capital that
a VC can call annually. For agreements that contain a specific
numeric cap on annual calls, I use the size of that cap. For agree-
ments that do not contain a numeric cap but that still restrict capital
calls to amounts that can be promptly invested, I assume an effective
cap of sixty percent per year.56 I obtain similar results when I use an
alternative measure of the option term-the number of years that a
VC needs to call the entire committed capital.
Presence of a Cap-Specifying Provision. A dummy variable that equals
1 when the fund's agreement has a provision establishing a numeric
cap of annually callable capital and that equals 0 otherwise.
Z Ratio of IPO to Total. For each venture capital fund in my sam-
ple, I first calculate the ratio of companies that this fund took public
to the total number of companies it funded. This raw ratio, however,
is skewed in favor of venture capital funds that were mostly active in
the late 1990s, when funds took a higher proportion of companies
55 As discussed above, the use of ordinal rankings as rough proxies for cardinal mea-
sures of legal variables is a popular coding technique.
56 This assumed minimum investment period is consistent with the minimum periods
cited by industry insiders for a venture fund to invest all of its committed capital and is also
equal to the highest cap present in my agreements. In robustness checks, I find similar
results when I assume that funds without numeric caps have a fifty percent cap.
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public. To avoid this cohort problem, for each fund in my sample, I
normalize the IPO-to-total ratio based on the ratios for all venture
funds that were raised in the same year. To do this, I use data from
VentureXpert for all venture funds raised in the same year as the fund
in question to compute Z-scores for each fund. I then lag this mea-
sure by one fund because when investors decide to invest in fund X,
they operate on the basis of performance information for fund X-1.
Therefore, for a fund numbered 10 in my sample, I use the normal-
ized IPO-to-total ratio for fund number 9 raised by the same venture
firm.
Z Ratio of Failure to Total. I use the same procedure as above ex-
cept that, instead of the ratio of IPOs to all companies funded by a
venture capital firm, I calculate the ratio of failed companies (listed in
VentureXpert as "defunct" or "bankrupt") to the total number of
companies. The normalization procedure is the same as discussed
above and is lagged by one fund.
Z Ratio of Success to TotaL This "success" measure uses a broader
measure of a venture capital firm's success than the IPO count. I code
a portfolio company as successful if it went public, was acquired, or
merged-that is, if a VC exited a portfolio company and recouped at
least some part of the investment. The normalization procedure is
the same as discussed above and is lagged by one fund.
Z IPO per Year of Venture Capital Firm's Existence. This is a firm-level
(rather than a fund-level) variable. It consists of the total number of
IPOs that a venture capital firm conducted in all years of its existence,
divided by the number of years of its existence. The normalization
procedure is the same as discussed above, based on the year of the
firm's creation.
Z Firm Size. The total amount of money that a venture capital
firm raised through all of its funds from the date of inception. The
normalization procedure is the same as discussed above and is based
on the year of the venture capital firm's creation.
Carried Interest. "Carry" or "carried" interest is a performance-
based, risky portion of VC compensation. I code it as a percentage of
a fund's profits that a partnership agreement allocates to VCs.
Management Fee. The management fee is a nonrisky portion of VC
compensation. It is paid on a quarterly basis and is typically a percent-
age of a fund's committed or invested capital. I coded it as the net
present value of management fees over a period of eleven years-the
typical ten-year duration of a fund plus one extension year-as a per-
centage of a fund's committed capital.5 7
57 For details on this as well as assumptions made in calculations of management fees,
see Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation
Arrangements, 76 U. CHi. L. REv. 161, 172-73 (2009).
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Year of Venture Firm Formation. Venture capital firms are small enti-
ties of indefinite duration that sequentially run multiple funds. Older
firms have likely developed solid reputations over time. This variable
indicates a calendar year when the venture capital firm that runs a
particular fund was formed.
Advisory Board. A dummy variable that indicates the presence of
an advisory board. It takes the value of one when a fund has such a
board and zero when it does not.
VI
REGRESSION RESULTS
A. Default Penalties
Table 3 presents correlations among main variables. Table 4
presents regression results for default penalty coefficients estimated
through Monte Carlo simulations. All regressions are ordinary least
squares (OLS) with venture capital firm clusters to control for
nonindependence of agreement used by funds of the same family.
Results are similar for regressions with firm fixed effects. The latter,
however, lose firm-level variables such as firm size and the number of
the IPOs per year of a firm's existence. A few venture organizations
also drop out because default penalties do not change across their
funds. To avoid losing observations, I present the OLS results here.
Basic proxies for the performance of a venture firm's prior
fund-the ratios of IPOs to the total number of companies and the
normalized ratios of all successes (IPOs, mergers, and acquisitions) to
the total-strongly and positively predict the strength of the default
penalty. The normalized ratio of failed companies to the total num-
ber of companies is a strong negative predictor. A firm-level variable,
the number of IPOs per year of a venture capital firm's existence, is
significant and positive. Another proxy for venture capital firm qual-
ity, the year of firm formation, is not a consistent predictor of a de-
fault penalty-it is positive in some specifications and negative in
others. The overall picture is consistent across most measures of VC
quality: less successful VCs run funds with lower default penalties.
Moving to the role of VC compensation: funds where VCs receive
compensation more heavily tilted toward a performance-based com-
ponent (a higher carry) have significantly higher default penalties.
Funds that have a lower nonperformance-based component (manage-
ment fee) have significantly higher default penalties. This is consis-
tent with Hypothesis #2: VCs whose overall compensation is riskier
and whose incentives are therefore more aligned with the interests of
LPs receive less investor control through default penalties.
As to the role of alternative governance mechanisms (advisory
boards): the coefficient is consistently positive and significant. That is,
2013] 1523
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR DEFAULT PENALTY COEFFICIENT
CODED VIA MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
OLS regression results. The sample is sixty venture capital funds raised by twenty-one venture
firms. The dependent variable is default penalty coefficients obtained through Monte Carlo
simulations. The independent variables are: standardized ratio of IPOs to total number of com-
panies funded by venture fund, standardized ratio of the number of failed companies to the
total number of companies, standardized ratio of successful companies (IPOs, mergers, acquisi-
tions) to failed companies, standardized size of a venture firm, fund's carried interest as a per-
centage of profit, NPV of fund's management fee as a percentage of committed capital, presence
of an advisory board, year of venture firm creation, percentage of annually callable committed
capital, and fundraising restrictions as a percentage of fund's capital that must be invested
before next fund is raised. Standard errors are clustered by venture firm. Results significant at
five percent level or higher are shown in boldface.
(2) (3) (6) (1) (4) (7)
Z IPO to Total 0.005 0.002
(3.66)*** (1.00)
Z Failure to Total -0.552 -0.535
(-3.16)*** (-2.76)**
Z Success to Total 0.006
(2.37)**
Z IPO per Year 0.016 0.017
(1.98)** (2.00)**
Z Firm Size -0.001
(-0.07)
Carried Interest 0.149 0.139 0.141 0.151 0.107 0.115
(2.17)** (2.33)** (2.35)** (2.18)** (1.80)* (1.75)*
Management Fee -0.325 -0.335 -0.335 -0.326 -0.308 -0.322
(-2.06)** (-2.22)** (-2.21)** (-2.09)** (-1.98)** (-2.01)**
Advisory Board 1.034 1.089 1.078 1.007 1.232 1.304
(2.25)** (2.25)** (2.27)** (2.20)** (2.24)** (2.18)
Year Firm Formation 0.075 0.081 0.081 0.075 0.080 -0.083
(2.60)** (2.83)** (2.79)** (2.60)** (2.67)** (2.57)**
% Callable Capital -0.035 -0.031 -0.031 -0.035 -0.026 -0.028
(-1.50) (-1.39) (-1.41) (-1.54) (-1.20) (-1.24)
Adj. R-sqr. 0.522 0.5797 0.5806 0.5270 0.5714 0.5822
No. 60 60 60 60 60 60
venture funds that use advisory boards also use higher default penal-
ties. This is consistent with Hypothesis #3: VCs who are monitored by
advisory boards receive less monitoring through the threat of investor
walkaway because higher penalties make investor walkaway more
difficult.
Table 5 presents the results of regressions where the default pen-
alty is coded through the "smell test"-the rough approximation of
the penalty's magnitude through a subjective ranking of penalties. Al-
most all of the results from prior regressions with the Monte
Carlo-based penalty coefficients are replicated here. The ratio of suc-
cessful companies to the total number of companies, the ratio of
failed companies to the total, the riskiness of VC compensation, and
the presence of an advisory board all strongly predict default penalties
in ways consistent with the optimal capital lock-in hypothesis and in-
consistent with maximum capital lock-in theories.
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TABLE 5. REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR DEFAULT PENALTY COEFFICIENT
CODED AS A "SMELL TEST"
OLS regression results. The sample is sixty venture capital funds raised by twenty-one venture
firms. The dependent variable is default penalty coefficients obtained through a "smell test" (a
rough subjective approximation). The independent variables are: standardized ratio of IPOs to
total number of companies funded by venture firm, standardized ratio of the number of failed
companies to the total number of companies, standardized ratio of IPOs to failed companies;
standardized amount of money raised by a venture firm, fund's carried interest as a percentage
of profit, fund's management fee as a percentage of committed capital, presence of an advisory
board, year of venture firm creation, percentage of annually callable committed capital, fun-
draising restrictions, and mandatory VC coinvestment. Standard errors are clustered by venture
firm. Results significant at ten percent level or higher are shown in boldface.
(2) (3) (6) (1) (4) (7)
Z IPO to Total 0.005 0.002
(2.52)** (0.78)
Z Failure to Total -0.025 -0.564
(-3.23)*** (-2.95)***
Z Success to Total 0.007
(2.02)**
Z IPO per Year 0.014 0.014
(1.64) (1.57)
Z Firm Size -0.004
(-0.34)
Carried Interest 0.177 0.167 0.169 0.180 0.139 0.139
(2.54)** (2.92)*** (2.90)*** (2.55)** (2.23)** (2.11)**
Management Fee -0.338 -0.348 -0.348 -0.339 -0.323 -0.324
(-2.10)** (-2.28)** (-2.26)** (-2.13)** (-1.96)* (-1.92)*
Advisory Board 1.451 1.512 1.498 1.418 1.633 1.646
(2.50)** (2.56)** (2.48)** (2.45)** (2.50)** (2.40)**
Year Finn Formation 0.053 0.059 0.060 0.053 0.057 0.057
(1.72)* (1.83)* (1.82)* (1.72)* (1.79)* (1.65)
% Callable Capital -0.028 -0.025 -0.025 -0.029 -0.020 -0.020
(-1.05) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.09) (-0.74) (-0.70)
Adj. R-sqr. 0.4676 0.5261 0.5269 0.4747 0.5018 0.5026
No. 60 60 60 60 60 60
B. Option Terms (Percent of Committed Capital Callable per
Year)
Table 6 presents regression results for the option term. Because I
measure the option term as the percentage of committed capital call-
able annually, a higher value for this variable means that it is more
difficult for an LP to walk away since the time for walking away is
shorter. As in Tables 4 and 5, all of the regressions in Table 6 are OLS
with venture firm clusters. A venture capital firm's size, which I use as
a proxy for its quality, emerges as a positive predictor of the percent-
age of committed capital callable annually. That is, better venture
firms call their capital faster and make it harder for LPs to walk away.
1526
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TABLE 6. REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR PERCENTAGE OF CALLABLE
CAPITAL (OPTrON TERM)
OLS regression results. The sample is sixty venture capital funds raised by twenty-one venture firms.
The dependent variable is the percentage of the fund's committed capital callable per year. The inde-
pendent variables are: standardized ratio of IPOs to total number of companies funded by venture
firm, standardized ratio of the number of failed companies to the total number of companies, stan-
dardized ratio of IPOs to failed companies, standardized amount of money raised by a venture firm,
fund's carried interest as a percentage of profit, fund's management fee as a percentage of committed
capital, presence of an advisory board, year of venture firm creation, percentage of annually callable
committed capital, fundraising restrictions, and mandatory VC coinvestment. Standard errors are clus-
tered by venture firm. Results significant at ten percent level or higher are shown in boldface.
(2) (3) (6) (1) (4) (7)
Z IPO to Total 0.016 0.015
(0.61) (0.51)
Z Failure to Total -0.527 -0.410
(-0.28) (-0.21)
Z Success to Total 0.027
(1.22)
Z IPO per Year -0.051 -0.032
(-0.62) (-0.39)
Z Firm Size 0.224
(2.89)**
Carried Interest 2.127 2.114 2.134 2.141 2.129 2.215
(5.07)*** (5.43)*** (5.16)*** (5.10)*** (5.33)*** (4.98)***
Management Fee -3.303 -3.335 -3.338 -3.315 -3.161 -3.253
(-4.04)*** (-4.10)*** (-4.03)*** (-4.02)*** (-4.07)*** (-4.19)***
Advisory Board 4.868 5.103 4.996 4.769 3.938 4.949
(0.66) (0.68) (0.66) (0.65) (0.48) (0.60)
Year Firm Formation -0.044 -0.036 -0.032 -0.037 -0.103 0.005
(-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.12) (-0.15) (-0.40) (0.02)
Default Penalty -2.637 -2.715 -2.729 -2.687 -2.162 -2.282
(-1.55) (-1.43) (-1.43) (0.65) (-1.10) (-1.11)
Adj. R-sqr. 0.4198 0.4193 0.4203 0.4220 0.4272 0.4643
No. 60 60 60 60 60 60
Carry and management fee, which I use as proxies for the riski-
ness of VC compensation, also strongly predict the option term. As
the VC compensation becomes riskier-with a higher carry and lower
management fee-the percentage of callable capital increases. Thus,
VCs whose compensation is more tightly aligned with the interests of
investors run funds that make it more difficult for investors to walk
away.
Other measures of VC quality, as well as the presence of an advi-
sory board, are not statistically significant predictors of the option
term.
C. Presence of a Cap-Specifying Provision
Table 7 presents regression results for the presence of a cap-speci-
fying provision in partnership agreements. Regressions are logit with
robust standard errors.
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TABLE 7. REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR THE PRESENCE OF NUMERIC CAP
ON CALLABLE CAPITAL
Logit regression results. The sample is sixty venture capital funds raised by twenty-one venture firms.
The dependent variable is the percentage of the fund's committed capital callable per year. The inde-
pendent variables are: standardized ratio of IPOs to total number of companies funded by venture
firm, standardized ratio of the number of failed companies to the total number of companies, stan-
dardized ratio of IPOs to failed companies, standardized amount of money raised by the venture firm,
fund's carried interest as a percentage of profit, fund's management fee as a percentage of committed
capital, presence of advisory board, year of venture firm creation, percentage of annually callable com-
mitted capital, fundraising restrictions, and mandatory VC coinvestment. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Results significant at ten percent level or higher are shown in
boldface.
Increase in
Indep. Var.
Regr (1) Regr (2) Regr (3) Regr (4) Regr (5) Makes Walkaway
Z IPO to Total -0.004
(-0.32)
Z Failure to Total -0.366
(-0.63)
Z IPO to Failure -0.004
(-0.47)
Z Success to Total -1.486 -1.135 Harder
(-1.93) (-2.78)
Z Firm Size -0.056 -0.127 -0.060 -0.074 -0.081 Harder
(-1.33) (-1.75) (-1.45) (-1.26) (-1.17)
Carry -0.324 -0.257 -0.321 -0.191 -0.226 Harder
(-2.79) (-2.02) (-2.78) (-2.12) (-2.14)
Management Fee 0.716 0.277 0.749 0.468 0.568 Easier
(1.93) (1.17) (1.93) (1.63) (1.63)
Advisory Board 1.994 2.061
(1.2) (1.08)
Founding Year 0.052 0.044 0.041 0.066
(1.01) (0.8) (0.83) (1.36)
Default Penalty 0.358 0.378
(2.36) (2.18)
Min. Coinvestment -0.167 Harder
(-1.9)
Pseudo R-sqr. 0.337 0.176 0.34 0.302 0.355
No. 60 60 46 60 60
As I mentioned, about half of the agreements in my sample have
provisions establishing numeric caps on annual capital calls. The rest
have only implicit caps established by the separate provision prohibit-
ing VCs from calling more capital than they can promptly invest.
Thus, it is valuable not only to look at the cumulative size of the cap
(created by the agreement's explicit and implicit provisions) but also
at whether a partnership agreement has a specific provision establish-
ing a numeric cap on callable capital to augment the standard call-to-
invest restriction. Since cap-specifying provisions impose more severe
restrictions on a VC's ability to call capital than the call-to-invest provi-
sions do, funds that have numeric caps lock in capital less tightly than
funds that do not use specific caps.
The results for the quality of the venture capital firm are weak
here. This is likely due to the brute nature of the test. However, the
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results that do emerge as significant are consistent with the optimal
lock-in hypothesis: The ratio of successful companies to all funded
companies total is a negative predictor of the presence of a cap-speci-
fying provision. That is, partnership agreements for the funds raised
by more successful VCs are less likely to restrict VCs' ability to call all
committed capital quickly, making it harder for investors to walk away
after they have signed commitment obligations. The results for other
measures of VC quality are not significant.
The riskiness of VC compensation is a negative predictor of the
presence of a cap: carry is always negative and significant, while man-
agement fee is always positive although only marginally significant and
sometimes insignificant. That is, as VC compensation becomes risk-
ier, a fund is less likely to have a specific cap on capital calls, which
means it is easier for VCs to call the entire capital commitment quickly
and therefore harder for LPs to walk away. This too is consistent with
the variable capital lock-in hypothesis.
Presence of an advisory board is not a significant predictor of the
presence of a numeric cap on capital calls.
D. Summary
Table 8 summarizes the findings from Tables 4 through 6. It con-
tains only the statistically significant relationships.
We see that across both proxies for the fund's walkaway regime,
default penalty coefficient and the duration of the option to walk
away, as VC compensation becomes more aligned with the interests of
LPs, walkaway becomes more difficult for LPs. Likewise, as the quality
of the VC increases, walkaway becomes more difficult, though this re-
sult is most pronounced for default penalty provisions and is only pre-
sent in several specifications for the option-term tests. Walkaway also
becomes more difficult when the fund uses alternative governance de-
vices, such as advisory boards. All of this supports the variable capital
lock-in hypothesis.
In sum, all statistically significant results are consistent with the
variable capital lock-in hypothesis. There is no support for the maxi-
mum capital lock-in theories.
CONCLUSION
The idea that capital lock-in is beneficial to companies is intui-
tively appealing but incomplete. This Article provides evidence that
venture capital partnerships vary the severity of default penalties, and
thus the extent of capital lock-in, in sensible ways. The magnitude of
capital lock-in is strongly related to several measures of expected
agency costs. As expected agency costs decline, venture capital funds
lock in their capital more tightly.
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APPENDIX
GRAPHICAL COMPARISON OF ACTUAL DATA TO SIMULATIONS:
THE VALUE OF CAPITAL AccouNT
The left-hand graphs show the actual distributions of value at the end of each year for an invest-
ment of 100. The right-hand graphs show the simulated distributions of value for an initial
investment of one.
Year 1: Histogram of the Actual Data: Histogram of the Simulated Returns:
50 100 150 200 250
Tota Value
ar 2: Histogram of the Actual Data:
0 100 200
Total Value
Year 3: Histogram of the Actual Data:
300 400
Histogram of the Simulated Returns:
Histogram of the Simulated Returns:
100 200 300
Tot] Value
400
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Year 4: Histogram of the Actual Data: Histogram of the Simulated Returns:
